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Abstract
Viewer’s private information consumption generates external benefits for
society, because information improves the ability of voters to control politi-
cians. Our study compares two settings in a free-to-air TV market: a dif-
ferentiated duopoly of private channels and an oligopoly with both private
channels and a public service broadcaster broadcasting information as well
as entertainment programs. We find that welfare effects of public service
broadcasting depend on its program design and cost efficiency, the external
benefits of voter’s information, and the magnitude of lost rents from the
advertising market.
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1 Introduction
Most European countries have a TV market that consists not only of private
broadcasters, but also of public service broadcasters, that is, institutions that do
not maximize profits but pursue collectively defined aims and which are financed
primarily by taxes (Spain) or license fees, levied on households (Sweden) or devices
(Germany up to 2012). In Germany, about 20% of channels are public channels,
with the two national public service channels ARD and ZDF reaching a viewer
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market share of over 25%.1 Recently, European public broadcasters have expanded
their activities to the provision of internet content and thereby triggered a new
debate about the eligibility of public service broadcasting in a digital world in
general (Armstrong, 2005; Hargreaves Heap, 2005; Armstrong and Weeds, 2007;
European Commission, 2009).
With regard to analog technology, economists have carved out several justifica-
tions for state intervention in the TV market, most of them not applicable to the
broadcasting technology available today. However, one argument still applies in
a digital world: information consumption does not only generate positive private
utility but also external benefits for society (Downs, 1957; Armstrong, 2005; von
Hagen and Seabright, 2007). In the Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union
(EU) public broadcasting is seen as to be directly related to the “democratic [...]
needs of each society” (European Union, 1997, p. 109). Especially politicians who
advocate public service broadcasting (European Commission, 2009; Department
for Culture Media and Sport, 2006) heavily rely on the effect that a high-quality
public broadcaster improves the ability of the citizenship to competently partic-
ipate in democratic decisions. From an economics point of view, selecting and
monitoring politicians can be considered a principal-agent problem with voters as
principals and politicians as agents. Media coverage of politicians and policies
increases voter information of current issues, which increases the responsiveness
of voters to alternative policies, which, in turn, increases the effort and the selec-
tion of politicians (Prat and Stro¨mberg, 2011). As a result, voter’s information
consumption results in better policies.
However, the information consumption through TV channels is a private deci-
sion for each voter. A voter considers the private costs of subscribing to a channel,
which is zero if it is a free-to-air channel, and the opportunity costs of time for
watching the program (and commercial breaks). On the other hand a voter benefits
from the entertaining value of the TV program and, if this program is informa-
tive, then the additional private benefit he or she derives from voting (and living)
1Data available at the MAVISE database: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/ and the Arbeitsgemein-
schaft Fernsehforschung (AGF): http://www.agf.de/.
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informed. The rational voter does not consider the external (social) benefit of infor-
mation for all other citizens. Each voter’s amount of information consumption is,
therefore, socially suboptimal. Public service broadcasting can remedy this mar-
ket failure through the free provision of informational programs. However, even if
an informational program is provided for free, still some voters will not watch it,
because this would take the time they like to spend watching a more entertaining
program (Armstrong, 2005). Voters who usually do not watch news, but shows
and sport, watch news if it is are broadcasted in between the half-time interval of
a soccer match or a popular show, similar to how they watch the commercial break
on a private TV channel (Rothbauer and Sieg, 2010). To improve consumption of
information, a possible strategy might, therefore, be to attract voters through the
broadcasting of entertaining programs mixed with informational content.
Against this background, we study the market entry or exit of a public service
channel, broadcasting a mix of information and entertainment but no commercials,
into or out of a duopoly of free-to-air private TV channels. We calculate the
reaction of the private channels and the advertisers in the two-sided TV market
and identify the conditions if and when a market entry or exit of the public channel
is welfare enhancing.
There are several broadcasting market studies focusing on different market
structures and failures. Anderson and Coate (2005) also make a welfare analysis
of a broadcasting market, but focus on the market outcome of commercial broad-
casting. They are interested in the question as to whether there is an over- or
under-provision of advertisements and over- or under-provision of programs. We
look at the external effects of the consumption of informational programs, an effect
that they do not model. However, we follow the seminal paper of Anderson and
Coate (2005) in many aspects.
Choi (2006) analyzes market entry in the broadcasting industry and the aligned
market failure. He considers entry decisions of private channels that compete for
viewers and commercial revenues. We analyze the market entry of a public service
TV channel that is not interested in commercial revenues and does not broadcast
commercials. However, the public channel attracts viewers and therefore reduces
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revenues of the private channels. By assuming free entry and exit of channels Choi
(2006) determines the optimal number of channels and detects market failure of
over- and under provision of channels. We do not allow for entry and exit of
private channels but consider a viable duopoly and analyze entry and exit of a
public channel.
Kind et al. (2007) analyze a public service TV channel that can partly correct
market distortions. Similar to our approach, they analyze a mixed oligopoly of
one pubic channel and two private free-to-air TV channels. However, the aim of
the public channel is to correct for the not welfare maximizing level of advertising
in the unregulated duopoly of private channels. They do not consider the external
effect of information on welfare.
Prat and Stro¨mberg (2005) compare a public monopoly and a mixed duopoly
with one public and one private broadcaster. The public channel is journalistically
independent, but the government influences the amount of resources that are avail-
able to the public broadcaster and whether the broadcaster should tailor its news
coverage to specific socio-economic groups in order to improve their re-election
probabilities. Whereas Prat and Stro¨mberg (2005) assume that the designs of the
incentives of the public broadcaster are driven by re-election efforts of politicians,
we do not analyze the objectives of the public broadcaster but instead evaluate
the market outcome and the welfare effects of a broad variety of public program
policies.
2 Model
We model a free-to-air broadcasting system common in many European countries
such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.
There are two types of TV programs. First, a TV channel may broadcast
entertaining shows, where the broadcasting time of shows is denoted by ts ∈ [0, 1].
Second, a TV channel may broadcast informational programs such as newscasts,
features about science, or economics and so on where the broadcasting time of
information programs is denoted by tinf ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, a TV channel may
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broadcast commercials, where the broadcasting time of commercials is denoted by
ta ∈ [0, 1]. Total broadcasting time is normalized to one, such that ts+tinf+ta = 1.
Production costs of all type of programs and commercials do not differ such that
broadcasting one unit of time costs cpr.
The number of consumers is normalized to one, and each consumer watches
one channel for one unit of time. Voters are heterogeneous in their preferences for
shows and information. The preference parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] is equally distributed.
The utility of voter λ from TV consumption is
Uλ = λ · ts + (1− λ) · tinf . (1)
We assume that consumers do not switch channels but watch the utility maximiz-
ing TV channel (Anderson and Coate, 2005; Peitz and Valetti, 2008). If channels
broadcast the same number of programs, then all consumers with λ < 1/2 prefer
the channel broadcasting more information, whereas all consumers with λ > 1/2
prefer the channel broadcasting more shows. No voter likes television advertising.
We do not consider nuisance cost of advertisements but assume that the utility
watching commercials is zero.2
2This utility function is similar to the function used by Anderson and Coate (2005) considering
the special case of nuisance costs γ = 0 and transport costs τ = 1. Let s denote type 0 and inf
denote type 1 in the sense of Anderson and Coate (2005). A consumer watching t0 channel 0 and
t1 channel one, both broadcasting ta commercials, gets an Anderson and Coate (2005) utility
UACλ = t0 [β − γta − τλ] + t1 [β − γta − τ(1− λ)] (2)
Because t1 = 1− ta − t0 and we consider the case dta = 0 it followsdt1 = −dt0 and therefore
dUACλ
dt0
= τ(1− 2λ) (3)
and
dUλ
dt0
= −1 + 2λ. (4)
Therefore, for each consumer λ ∈ [0, 1], there is a consumer κ = 1− λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
dUACλ
dt0
=
dUκ
dt0
. (5)
Marginal utility of an additional minute of one channel is the same.
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We consider advertising that informs consumers about new products they
would buy if they knew them (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984). Let, as in Choi
(2006, p. 190), the demand for commercials per viewer when the level of advertis-
ing is ta be
p(ta) = a · t−βa . (6)
0 < β < 1 is the constant elasticity, and a > 0 represents the benefit that in-
formative advertising provides to advertisers.3 As in Anderson and Coate (2005),
consumer surplus of actually buying the advertised product is assumed to be zero.
Revenues per viewer are R(ta) = p(ta) · ta. The viewer base v of a channel is
not fixed but changes due to the competition from other channels depending on
advertising levels and program type.4 Free-to-air channels maximize profits
Π(ta) = p(ta) · ta · v − cpr. (7)
Since consumers single home, broadcasting stations hold monopoly power over
access to their viewers. Advertisers’ per viewer surplus from advertising ta units
of time is represented by ∫ ta
0
p(t)dt. (8)
Since consumers do not like commercials, channels may attract rival’s audience
attention by reducing broadcasting time for commercials. If both channels broad-
cast the same contents, then the channel with marginally less commercials attracts
all viewers. However, a reduction of commercials jeopardizes revenues. Gabszewicz
et al. (2004) and Peitz and Valetti (2008) model this kind of programming and
advertising competition and show that to mitigate this Bertrand-fashion compe-
tition, channels reinforce program differentiation. If viewer dislike commercials,
then content duplication does not occur. We do not model programming compe-
tition but assume a duopoly of two differentiated TV channels, a show channel
3The demand per viewer function used by Anderson and Coate (2005) differs in their special
form to the demand function we adopted from Choi (2006, p. 190). However, both functions are
log concave with decreasing per viewer marginal revenue.
4Since we assume that the market is covert in any case, v can also be interpreted as market
share.
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that broadcasts entertainment and commercials only and an information chan-
nel that does not broadcast entertaining shows, but information programs and
commercials.
The consumption of informational programs creates an external effect, be-
cause voter information “increases the responsiveness of voters to policy, which
increases the effort and selection of politicians, producing better policies,” (Prat
and Stro¨mberg, 2011, p. 30), an effect that a single voter only partially considers
when choosing a TV channel. The external effect is modeled as in Rothbauer and
Sieg (2010) by normalizing the pre-TV information of each voter to zero, such that
a positive level of information is only reached by watching informational programs
on TV. Therefore, a voter who watches channel ch possesses Iλ = t
ch
inf informa-
tion. We call the output of (better) policies Y and assume that information I is
the only factor of production. Due to universal suffrage, each voter equally in-
fluences the production of Y through his or her amount of information, that is,
two voters, λ, κ ∈ [0, 1] who share the same amount of information, Iλ = Iκ, have
the same marginal product, ∂Y/∂Iλ = ∂Y/∂Iκ. Therefore, there exists a function,
g : [0, 1] → R, such that Y = ∫ 1
0
g(Iλ)dλ. We assume that marginal information
consumption has a nonnegative effect on Y , because policies are better when the
citizenry is well informed. Further, we assume a diminishing marginal product
of information. A minute of additional information is much more useful for a
voter who is quite uninformed than for a voter who already has a large stock of
information. We define the social output of information
Y =
∫ 1
0
Iαλ dλ (9)
where 0 < α < 1 determines how fast the marginal productivity of information
consumption diminishes.
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3 Market equilibria
3.1 Duopoly of two private channels
In the Nash equilbrium of the duopoly, both private channels maximize profits
(7) through the optimal choice of commercial broadcasting time ta sold to the
advertisers. Private channels sell the time ta for the price p(ta) according to
(6). The price a channel may charge is independent of the time the competing
channel is offering, whereas competition between channels is through the market
share of viewers. Increasing the time of commercials decreases the utility a con-
sumer receives from viewing and may let him switch to the other channel. If the
show channel broadcasts tas commercials and the information channel tai, then the
viewer λ˜ = (1− tai)/(2− tai− tas) is indifferent between both channels. Therefore,
vi = λ˜ viewers watch the information channel and vs = 1 − λ˜, the show channel.
Assuming a given time of commercials of the competing channel, channels max-
imize profits Πj = vj · p(taj) · taj, j ∈ {i, s}. The best response function for the
information channel is
tbai =
3− tas
2
+
1− tas −
√
(1− tas) (8− (8− β)β − (2− β)2tas)
2(1− β) = t
b(tas), (10)
and for the show channel, analogously, tbas = t
b(tai).
In the Nash equilibrium of the duopoly, the broadcasting time of commercials
is
t+ai = t
+
as = 1−
1
3− 2β . (11)
The broadcasting time of non-commercial programs is
t+i = t
+
s = 1− t+aj =
1
3− 2β . (12)
The price for commercials is
p+i = p
+
s = a · (t+aj)−β = a
(
1− 1
3− 2β
)−β
. (13)
As a result, λ˜+ = 1/2, and both channels reach the same market share of v+i =
v+s = 1/2. Equilibrium profits are
Π+i = Π
+
s = v
+
j · p+j · t+aj − cpr = a(2− 2β)−β(3− 2β)−1+β(1− β)− cpr. (14)
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In this market, consumers earn a surplus of
CR+ =
∫ λ˜+
0
t+i · (1− λ) dλ+
∫ 1
λ˜+
t+s · λ dλ
=
3
12− 8β .
(15)
The first integral is the consumer surplus from watching the information channel,
and the second integral, from watching the show channel. The surplus for the
firms that buy commercials is
R+ = v+i
∫ t+ai
0
a · (t+ai)−β − p+i dtai + v+s
∫ t+as
0
a · (t+as)−β − p+s dtas
= a(1− β)−β
(
3
2
− β
)β−1
β,
(16)
where the first term is the surplus of advertisers on the information channel and
the second term, from advertisers on the show channel. Since only viewers of the
information channel, that is, λ ∈ [0, λ˜+] consume informational content, the social
output of information is
Y + =
∫ λ˜+
0
(t+i )
α dλ =
1
2
(3− 2β)−α. (17)
It is easy to sum up the rents as well as the informational rents to get a welfare
of
W+ = Π+i + Π
+
s + CR
+ +R+ + Y +
=
1
4
(
2(3− 2β)1−α + a · 23−β
(
1
1−β + 2
)β
+ 3
)
+ (4β − 6)cpr
3− 2β .
(18)
3.2 A Public Channel and two private channels
Now we consider an oligopoly of two private and a public channel broadcasting tp
of information and 1− tp of entertaining shows. Production costs cp are financed
by a non-distorting tax. The public channel acts as a Stackelberg leader deciding
to enter the market and to broadcast tp of information.
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The objective of the public broadcaster entering the market is not in the focus
of this study. We rather analyze the outcome of entry with a program policy tp.
The objective of the public broadcaster is decided by the government through a
political process. Interest groups of this process are private channels that prefer
no competition with a public channel at all. When competition occurs, the in-
formation channel prefers a low tp, whereas the show channel prefers a high tp.
Private firms who buy commercials prefer a small public channel, because they
are not able to reach consumers who watch the public channel. Politicians may
follow these interest groups. Another approach is that politicians try to maximize
welfare by establishing a public channel or they could try to maximize Y in order
to stabilize democracy. By maximizing Y , they could accept a constraint of not
sacrificing welfare for additional Y . However, they could also be willing to reduce
overall welfare just to improve Y . We do not analyze the process and the result
of this political process but analyze arbitrary policies for the public channel. We
ask if and when it is possible to enter the duopoly of private channels with a
public channel and improve welfare and Y by not displacing the private channels
completely.
The public channel broadcasting entertainment and information attracts view-
ers of both channels and is, therefore, competing with both channels. However,
both private channels are not competing directly anymore. If all channels attract
viewers, then a small change of commercial broadcasting time or the public pro-
gram may induce a viewer of the show channel to switch to the public channel,
but this viewer will never switch to the information channel directly. Consumer of
type
λ˜i =
tai + tp − 1
tai + 2(tp − 1) (19)
is indifferent between the information and the public channel, consumer of type
λ˜s =
tp
2tp − tas (20)
is indifferent between the show and the public channel (see Figure 1).
The private show channel, therefore, only competes with the public channel. To
maximize profits, the best response is, therefore, depends only the public program
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Figure 1: Consumer type and channel choice
policy tp:
t∗as(tp) =
βˆ
2(1− β) · tp (21)
with β˜ =
√
8− (8− β)β and βˆ = 4−3β− β˜. Analogously, the private information
channel responds by
t∗ai(tp) =
βˆ
2(1− β) · (1− tp). (22)
Using these best-response functions, we can calculate the indifferent viewers
and market shares. Interestingly, both do not depend on the public channels
program tp. Indifferent viewers are
λ˜∗i =
t∗ai + tp − 1
t∗ai + 2(tp − 1)
=
1
4
(
−β˜ − β + 4
)
(23)
and
λ˜∗s =
tp
2tp − t∗as
=
1
4
(
β˜ + β
)
. (24)
Thus, the public channel attracts viewers of an amount of
v∗p = λ˜
∗
s − λ˜∗i =
1
2
(
β˜ + β − 2
)
(25)
and an amount of
v∗i = λ˜
∗
i = v
∗
s = (1− λ˜∗s) =
1
4
(
4− β˜ − β
)
(26)
viewers stay with their preferred private channel.
Prices for commercials depend on the public channels program tp. The price
for commercials on the information channel is
p∗i = a · (t∗ai)−β = a · 2β
(
βˆ(1− tp)
1− β
)−β
(27)
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and
p∗s = a · (t∗as)−β = a · 2β
(
βˆtp
1− β
)−β
(28)
on the show channel.
Now the profits of the private channels are
Π∗i = v
∗
i · p∗i · t∗ai − cpr =
a · (1− tp)1−ββ¯βˆ1−β
23−β(1− β)1−β − cpr (29)
with β¯ = 4− β − β˜ and
Π∗s = v
∗
s · p∗s · t∗as − cpr =
a · t1−βp β¯β˜1−β
23−β(1− β)1−β − cpr. (30)
Consumers watching the private information channel earn rents
CR∗i =
∫ λ˜∗i
0
t∗i · (1− λ)dλ =
(
β
(
β + β˜
)
− 2
)(
2− β − β˜ − tpβˆ
)
2(1− β)
(
β − β˜
)2 . (31)
Consumers watching the private show channel earn rents
CR∗s =
∫ 1
λ˜∗s
t∗s · λ dλ
=
2− β
(
β + β˜
)
(
β − β˜
)2 − tp
(
4− β˜ + β
(
1− 2β˜ − 2β
(
3− β − β˜
)))
(1− β)
(
β − β˜
)2 . (32)
Consumer watching the public channel earn rents
CR∗p =
∫ λ˜∗s
λ˜∗i
tp · (1− λ) + (1− tp) · λ dλ = −1
2
+
β
4
+
1
4
β˜. (33)
Firms who buy commercials from the private information channel earn rents
R∗i = v
∗
i
∫ t∗ai
0
a · (t∗ai)−β − p∗i dtai =
aββ¯(1− tp)1−ββˆ1−β
23−β(1− β)2−β . (34)
Firms who buy commercials from the private show channel earn rents
R∗s = v
∗
s
∫ t∗as
0
a · (t∗as)−β − p∗s dtas =
aββ¯t1−βp βˆ
1−β
23−β(1− β)2−β . (35)
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Finally, the output of consumer’s information is
Y ∗ =
∫ λ˜∗i
0
(t∗i )
α dλ+
∫ λ˜∗s
λ˜∗i
tαp dλ =
tαp βˆ −
(
2− β − β˜
)(
1− (1−tp)βˆ)
2(1−β)
)α
−β + β˜ . (36)
It is easy to sum up these terms to get total welfare
W ∗ = Π∗i + Π
∗
s + CR
∗
i + CR
∗
s + CR
∗
p +R
∗
i +R
∗
s + Y
∗ − cp (37)
which only depends on (tp, a, α, β, cpr, cp).
4 Welfare comparison
Proposition 1 For given (a, α, β, cpr, cp), the market entry of a public channel
broadcasting tp of information and 1 − tp of shows does not squeeze the private
information channel from the market if
Π∗i =
a(1− tp)1−ββ¯βˆ1−β
23−β(1− β)1−β − cpr > 0 (38)
does not squeeze the private show channel from the market if
Π∗s =
a · t1−βp β¯β˜1−β
23−β(1− β)1−β − cpr > 0, (39)
is welfare enhancing if (see also (46) in Appendix A)
W ∗ > W+ (40)
and improves the social output of information if (see also (47) in Appendix A)
Y ∗ > Y +. (41)
Proposition 1 enables the policy maker knowing the parameters (a, α, β, cpr, cp)
to check whether a public channel is welfare enhancing, Y enhancing, and whether
or not the channel squeezes a private channel out of the market. Figure 2 is
a numerical visualization of parameter constellations of welfare-improving pub-
lic channels with both private channels viable and an enhanced social output of
information.
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Figure 2: Welfare and Y enhancing parameter combinations with both private
channels viable, cp = cpr = 0.1, a = 0.5
We can also analytically prove, that there is a combination of parameters
(a, α, β, cpr, cp) and tp that, indeed, improves welfare and Y and does not squeeze
the private channels out of the market. For this purpose, we take a closer look at
the symmetric case, where both private channels and the public broadcaster at-
tract a viewer market share of 1/3, and both private channels earn the same profit.
The market share of channels is not dependent on the share of information broad-
casting time on the public service channel, but is 1/3 whenever β = 1/3. However,
the only case for which profits of private channels are the same is where the public
service channel broadcasts entertaining shows for half of the broadcasting time
and information programs for the other half, that is, tp = 1/2.
5
5It can be shown that for β = 1/3 a welfare maximizer chooses 1/2 ≤ tp < 1 (see Appendix
B).
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Proposition 2 Let β = 1/3 and
cp <
2
21
− 1
2
(
3
7
)α
+
2−α
3
+ 2−2α3−1+α = c˜. (42)
Then for all
a <
−8− 7 · 22−α − 7 · 22−2α3α + 2 · 31+α71−α + 84cp
21 · 22/3 − 36 · 141/3 = a˜ (43)
and
cpr <
4 + 7 · 21−α + 7 · 21−2α3α − 31+α71−α − 42cp
9 · 22/3 (−7 · 21/3 + 12 · 71/3) = c˜pr (44)
a public channel broadcasting tp = 1/2 as well improves welfare as the social output
of information by not squeezing a private channel out of the market.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 shows that the costs of the public broadcaster cp have to be small,
so that welfare is improved by market entry of a public service broadcaster. The
value of the critical costs of the public service broadcaster c˜ depends on the rate at
which the marginal productivity of information α diminishes. This is because the
value of α determines the effect of the introduction of public service broadcasting
on the social output of information Y , which, in turn, determines the effect on
welfare W .
Further, the value of television advertising a has to be small. The intuition
behind this result is that the public channel attracts viewers, which would watch
private channels in absence of public service broadcasting. In the attempt of not
losing too many viewers, private channels decrease their commercial broadcasting
time as a reaction of market entry of a public service broadcaster. Although
this reaction increases consumer surplus from watching TV, it decreases profits
and advertisers surplus. In contrast to consumer surplus, profits and advertisers’
surplus depend on the value of television advertising. Therefore, a large value of
television advertising, that is, a large a, decreases the chance that public service
broadcasting improves welfare.
The critical value of television advertising a˜ again depends on α and addi-
tionally on the costs of the public service broadcaster. If the costs of the public
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service broadcaster are large, then lost advertisers’ surplus and lost profits of pri-
vate channels have to be low to ensure that public service broadcasting is welfare
enhancing.
The third inequation ensures that market entry of a public service broadcaster
is not only welfare enhancing, but, in addition, that private channels are still
profitable. To obtain this result, costs of private channels cpr have to be small.
The value of the critical costs of private channels c˜pr also depend on α and the costs
of the public service broadcaster. Imagine an increase in the costs of the public
service broadcaster. To still trigger an increase of welfare through the market entry
of the public service broadcaster, the value of advertising has to be low. However,
a low value of advertising triggers low profits, such that private costs have to be
low, to ensure that private channels are still profitable. Thus, with high costs of
the public service broadcaster, private costs have to be small to ensure that welfare
increases and channels are profitable with a public service channel in the market.
With regard to the change in the social output of information Y , there is no
restriction, because in the symmetric case of β = 1/3 and tp = 1/2, the increase
in social output of information is
Y ∗ − Y + = 2
1+α + 3α (2− 3 (4/7)α)
3 · 21+2α > 0 (45)
for all 0 < α < 1.
5 Conclusion
The digitalization of the media sector significantly decreased market entry barri-
ers to the broadcasting industry. Market failures based on these barriers, thus,
tend to lose their importance. As a result, the question as to whether market in-
tervention through public service broadcasting is justified has to be re-examined.
A market failure that still remains in a digital world is that private information
consumption ignores the external benefits for society, such that aggregated infor-
mation consumption is expected to be smaller than socially optimal. To internalize
this information externality, a public broadcaster can provide information for free.
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However, since viewers still experience opportunity costs of time to consume the
information program, some consumers who usually prefer entertaining shows have
to be subsidized for information consumption by the offer of more entertaining
programs.
We have analyzed a differentiated duopoly in a free-to-air TV market in the
absence of a public broadcaster and in the presence of a public service broadcaster
broadcasting information as well as entertainment programs and compared both
settings for a broad variety of public programs. In the symmetric case, the social
output of information is always larger in the presence of a public service broad-
caster, but for welfare, the results are ambiguous. Whether a public broadcaster
increases welfare depends on its costs and the importance of the advertising in-
dustry. If the public broadcaster produces large costs and on the other hand, then
the advertising industry generates large rents for society, the chance that welfare
is improved by public service broadcasting is small. We also find that large costs
of a public broadcaster increase the danger that the public broadcaster replaces
private channels. For the European TV markets, this result suggests that (incum-
bent) public service broadcasting is crowding out private programs.
To summarize, well-designed public service broadcasting may remedy the mar-
ket failure that is present even today: It is able to improve the information con-
sumption of consumers and, as a result, to improve the quality of voters to control
politicians. Whether a public service broadcaster is welfare enhancing crucially de-
pends on its program design and its cost efficiency, the external benefits of voters’
information, and the magnitude of lost rents from the advertising market.
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Appendix A
W ∗ −W+ > 0⇐⇒
2βa
(
(1− tp)βtp + (1− tp)tβp
)
β¯βˆ
(
(1− tp)tpβˆ
1− β
)−β
− 4(1− β)
(β − β˜)2 [2β − β
3 + 2tp(4 + β(1− 2(3− β)β))− 2β˜
+ 2(1− β)
(
1− (1− tp)βˆ
2(1− β)
)α (
β − β˜
)(
−2 + β + β˜
)
+ β˜
(
2tp(−1− 2(1− β)β) + ββ˜
)
+ βˆ
(
2tαp (1− β)
(
β − β˜
)
+ tp
(
−2 + β2 + ββ˜
))
]
>
8cp + 2
(
3 + 2(3− 2β)1−α + 8a
(
1 + 1−3+2β
)−β)
3− 2β
 (1− β)2
(46)
Y ∗ − Y + > 0⇐⇒
(
β˜ + β − 2
)(
1− βˆ(tp−1)
2(β−1)
)α
+ βˆtp
α
β˜ − β >
1
2
(3− 2β)−α (47)
Appendix B
If β = 1/3, then
∆W = W ∗ −W+ =
=
1
84
[8− 2 31+α71−α − 84cp + 3 21/3a
(−1271/3 + 7(1− tp)2/3 + 7t2/3p )+
28
(
1
2
+
tp
2
)α
+ 28tαp ]
(48)
with
∂∆W
∂tp
=
1
6
(
21/3a
(
− 1
(1− tp)1/3 +
1
t
1/3
p
)
+
((
1
2
+
tp
2
)−1+α
+ 2t−1+αp
)
α
)
(49)
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and limtp→1,tp<1 ∂∆W/∂tp = −∞. Further, for 0 < tp < 1/2,
− 1
(1− tp)1/3 +
1
t
1/3
p
> 0 (50)
and, therefore, ∂∆W/∂tp > 0 for 0 < tp < 1/2. Neither 0 < tp < 1/2 nor tp = 1 is
optimal.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
If β = 1/3 and tp = 1/2, then the difference W
∗ −W+ is positive if and only if
a <
−8− 7 · 22−α − 7 · 22−2α3α + 2 · 31+α71−α + 84cp
21 · 22/3 − 36 · 141/3 = a˜ (51)
and a˜ > 0 if and only if
cp <
2
21
− 1
2
(
3
7
)α
+
2−α
3
+ 2−2α3−1+α = c˜ (52)
If the public channel chooses 1/2 = tp, Πi = Πs and to have both channels
viable Πi = Πs ≥ 0 has to hold.
Πi = Πs ≥ 0 iff
cpr ≤ a˜/(6 · 21/3) = 4 + 7 · 2
1−α + 7 · 21−2α3α − 31+α71−α − 42cp
9 · 22/3 (−7 · 21/3 + 12 · 71/3) = c˜pr. (53)
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